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Abstract. We present a proposal for an undeniable signature scheme
based in supersingular hyperelliptic curves of genus 2.
1 Introduction
An undeniable signature is a digital signature scheme which allows the signer to
be selective to whom they allow to verify signatures. The scheme adds explicit
signature repudiation, preventing a signer later refusing to verify a signature by
omission; a situation that would devalue the signature in the eyes of the verifier.
Currently, there exists some concern about the definition of cryptographic
algorithms able to resist attacks using a quantum computer. Among the tech-
niques presumably able to lead to quantum-resistant cryptographic schemes, we
find the use of isogenies of supersingular elliptic curves, which has proved to be
an interesting solution in the definition of key exchanges [5], digital signatures
[6] and also has been explored in the definition of hash functions [4], [23] and
oblivious transfer protocols [1].
As pointed out by [3], there is a general awareness that many proposals,
such as the isogeny-based Diffie-Hellman key exchange, should be generalized
to principally polarized abelian surfaces. Among the motivations that support
the research based on isogenies of higher genus curves we find the fact that the
genus 2 isogeny graph is much regular than the graph in the genus 1 setting
and this gives the chance to achieve similar security levels with less isogeny
computations together with the opportunity to perform better security analysis.
Furthermore, as noted in [24], the number of 2-isogenies between elliptic curves
is three whereas abelian surfaces have fifteen (2, 2)-isogenies, and this fact may
improve the security of schemes using supersingular hyperelliptic curves.
This paper follows the philosophy in [3] and presents a proposal for a genus
2 undeniable digital signature scheme based on the proposal in [16] and using
the techniques developed in [8].
Concerning the structure of the document: the introduction is followed by the
basics about the required mathematics (jacobians and Richelot isogenies, essen-
tially) and undeniable signatures. Section 3 is devoted to the genus 2 signature
scheme, where we define the set-up, the key generation process and the signature
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procedure. The paper is closed with Section 4, devoted to the computationally
complex problems involved in the security of the scheme, together with a few
remarks on the correctness of our proposal.
2 Fundamentals
This section is devoted to the mathematical requirements for the correct un-
derstanding of the forthcoming sections of this paper. The main reference for
abelian varieties is [20], whereas [8] is a very good reference for the study of the
structure of the isogeny graph in the genus-2 framework.
2.1 Mathematical background
A Richelot isogeny is a (2, 2)-isogeny between jacobians JH of genus 2 curves H ,
that is: its kernel is isomorphic, as a group, to F2 ⊗ F2 and is maximal isotropic
with respect to the 2-Weil pairing.
Those familiar with isogeny graphs know that j-invariants play a central role
in the definition of the graph. In the genus 2 context the role played by the
j-invariant is replaced with the so called G2-invariants [2]. The G2-invariants of
a genus 2 curve are absolute invariants that characterize the isomorphism class
of the curve. Let H be a genus 2 curve and let J2, J4, J6, J8 and J10 denote the
associated Igusa invariants, then the G2-invariants are defined as follows:
G = (g1, g2, g3) :=
(
J52
J10
,
J32J4
J10
,
J22J6
J10
)
. (1)
It is known (Chapter V, Section 13 [20]) that an ample divisor L of an
abelian variety A defines an isogeny ϕL : A → Aˆ called a polarization of A.
If ϕL is an isomorphism, then the polarization is called principal, and A is a
principally polarized abelian variety. The degree of a polarization is its degree
as an isogeny.
The following result, allows us to work with jacobians of hyperelliptic curves
of genus 2:
Theorem 1 (Theorem 1 [8]). Given a prime p and a finite field Fp. If A is
a principally polarized abelian surface over Fp, then:
1. A ∼= JH , where JH denotes the jacobian of some smooth (hyperelliptic) genus
2 curve H, or
2. A ∼= E1 × E2 for some elliptic curves E1 and E2.
Proof. The proof of (1) follows from Theorem 4 [22] whereas (2) is a direct
consequence of Theorem 3.1 [13].
Another key ingredient is Proposition 1 [8] which proves the fact that isoge-
nies with isotropic kernels preserve principal polarizations, what motivates using
Richelot isogenies.
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Proposition 1 (Proposition 1 [8]). Let H be a hyperelliptic curve of genus
2 over Fpn . Let K be a finite, proper and Fpn-rational subgroup of JH(Fpn).
There exists a principally polarized abelian surface A over Fpn and an isogeny
ϕ : JH → A with kernel generated by K if, and only if, K is a maximal m-
isotropic subgroup of JH [m] for some positive integer m.
Proof. The existence of A follows immediately from Theorem 10.1 (Chapter VII,
Section 10 [20]). In order to prove that it is in fact a principally polarized abelian
surface, one defines a polarization µ = [deg(ϕ)] ◦ λ on JH , which is equipped
with a principal polarization λ. One gets a polarization on JH/K of degree 1
using Theorem 16.8 and Remark 16.9 (Chapter V, Section 16 [20]).
2.2 Undeniable signatures
We follow Section 4.1 [16] in order to define an undeniable digital signature
scheme as a tuple of algorithms
UDS = (KeyGen, Sign, Check, CON, DIS),
where the role of CON is for the signer to prove to the verifier that the
signature is valid, whereas DIS allows a valid signer to prove to the verifier that
the signature received is not valid.
The scheme must be both unforgeable and invisible, where unforgeability is
described with the following game between a challenger and an adversary A:
1. The challenger generates a pair of keys (pbk, pvk) and provides A with pbk.
2. Given some qs ∈ N and for i = 1, . . . , qs, A queries Sign adaptively with a
message µi in order to obtain a signature σi.
3. A outputs a forgery (µ⋆, σ⋆).
The adversary A is allowed to submit pairs (µj , σj) to Check in step 2, which
proceed as follows:
1. If (µj , σj) is a valid pair, then Check outputs a bit b = 1 and proceeds with
the execution of CON.
2. Otherwise Check proceeds with the execution of DIS.
The adversary A succeeds in producing a strong forgery if (µ⋆, σ⋆) is valid
and not among the pair generated during the queries in step 2. The signature
scheme is strongly unforgeable if the probability of A succeeding in producing a
strong forgery is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary A.
Concerning invisibility, it is defined through the following game between a
challenger and an adversary:
1. The challenger generates a pair (pbk, pvk) of keys and provides A with pbk.
2. The adversary A is allowed to issue, adaptively, a series of signing queries µi
to Sign and receive signatures σi.
3. At some point, A takes a message µ⋆ and sends it to the challenger.
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4. The challenger takes a random bit b. If b = 1, the he computes the real
signature σ⋆ for µ⋆ using pvk. Otherwise he computes a fake signature σ†
for µ⋆ and sends it to A.
5. The adversary A issues some more signing queries.
6. At the end of the game, A outputs a guess b′.
The adversary A is allowed to submit pairs (µj , σj) to Check adaptively in
steps 2 and 5, but it is not allowed to submit the challenge (µ⋆, σ⋆) to Check
in step 5. Further, A is not allowed to submit µ⋆ to Sign.
The signature scheme is invisible if no probabilistic polynomial time adver-
sary A has non-negligible advantage in this game.
For an undeniable signature to be secure, it is required to satisfy both un-
forgeability and invisibility. Furthermore, both CON and DIS must be com-
plete, sound and zero-knowledge.
3 Genus 2 undeniable digital signature scheme
Here we define our undeniable digital signature scheme for supersingular hy-
perelliptic curves. The proposal relies heavily in the proposal made by Jao and
Soukharev [16] using the techniques used by the author in [7].
3.1 Set-up
Let us consider a prime of the form p = leAA l
eM
M l
eC
C f ± 1 where lA, lM , lC and f
are integers and f is small. Fix a supersingular hyperelliptic curve of genus 2
which can be found by thinking it as the double cover of a supersingular ellip-
tic curve of genus 1. We then use a random sequence of Richelot isogenies to
get a random principally polarized supersingular abelian surface. We also con-
sider generating sets {A1, A2, A3, A4}, {M1,M2,M3,M4} and {C1, C2, C3, C4}
for JH [l
eA
A ], JH [l
eM
M ] and JH [l
eC
C ], respectively. Finally, we take a hash function
H : {0, 1}⋆ → Z12.
3.2 Key generation
The signer takes parameters a1, . . . , a12 ∈ Z/l
eA
A Z following the techniques de-
scribed in Section 3.2 [8] and computes an isogeny ϕA : JH → JA, with kernel
KA :=
〈
4∑
i=1
[ai]Ai,
8∑
i=5
[ai]Ai−4,
12∑
i=9
[ai]Ai−8
〉
, (2)
together with {ϕA(Ci)}i=1,2,3,4 and the invariants G(JA). Then:
– pbk := (G(JA), {ϕA(Ci)}i=1,2,3,4).
– pvk := {ai}i=1,...,12.
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3.3 Signing
LetM be the space of admitted messages. For a given message µ ∈M the signer
computes the hash value H(µ) = (h1, . . . , h12). The signer also computes
KM :=
〈
4∑
i=1
[hi]Mi,
8∑
i=5
[hi]Mi−4,
12∑
i=9
[hi]Mi−8
〉
, (3)
together with the following isogenies and points:
– ϕM : JH → JM = JH/〈KM 〉.
– ϕMAM : JM → JAM = JM/〈ϕM (KA)〉.
– ϕAAM : JA → JAM = JA/〈ϕA(KM )〉.
– {ϕMAM (ϕM (Ci))}i=1,2,3,4.
– G(JAM ).
The signature is defined as σ := (G(JAM ), {ϕ
M
AM (ϕM (Ci))}i=1,2,3,4).
The following diagram provides a global view of the above calculations and
of the signing procedure:
JH JA
JM JAM
ϕA
ϕM ϕA
AM
ϕM
AM
(4)
3.4 The algorithms CON and DIS
The algorithms CON and DIS are required when we need to prove that a
received signature is valid or when the signer is required to prove that a signature
is not valid, respectively. Both algorithms have a common part:
1. The signer takes parameters c1, . . . , c12 ∈ Z/l
eC
C Z, according to Section 3.2
[8], and computes:
i. The isogeny ϕC : JH → JC whose kernel is given by
KC :=
〈
4∑
i=1
[ci]Ci,
8∑
i=5
[ci]Ci−4,
12∑
i=9
[ci]Ci−8
〉
. (5)
ii. The isogeny ϕMMC : JM → JMC whose kernel is given by
KMC =
〈
4∑
i=1
[ci]ϕM (Ci),
8∑
i=5
[ci]ϕM (Ci−4),
12∑
i=9
[ci]ϕM (Ci−8)
〉
. (6)
We observe that
JMC ∼=
JM
KMC
=
JM
〈ϕM (KC)〉
∼=
JC
〈ϕC(KM )〉
(7)
6 R. Ferna`ndez-Vale`ncia
iii. JAC =
JA
〈ϕA(KC)〉
∼= JC〈ϕC(KA)〉 .
iv. The isogeny ϕCMC : JC → JMC whose kernel is given by KMC and
v. JAMC =
JMC
〈ϕC
MC
(KA)〉
.
2. The signer outputs G(JC),G(JAC),G(JMC),G(JAMC) and ker
(
ϕCMC
)
as the
commitment.
3. The verifier takes a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
We now describe the algorithm CON:
– If b = 0: the signer sends ker(ϕC). Using pbk, the verifier computes ker
(
ϕAAC
)
.
Using ker(ϕM ), the verifier computes ϕ
M
MC . Using the digital signature, the
verifier may compute ϕAMAMC and, with ker(ϕC), the verifier can compute
ϕCMC in order to check the commitment.
– If b = 1: the signer sends ker
(
ϕCAC
)
and the verifier computes ϕMCAMC together
with ϕACAMC and checks that each ϕ
C
AC , ϕ
MC
AMC and ϕ
AC
AMC maps between the
curves specified in the commitment.
ConcerningDIS, let JF be a falsified version of JAM and Fi, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4,
be the falsified points corresponding to ϕMAM (ϕM (Ci)). Then:
– If b = 0: the signer outputs ker(ϕC) and the verifier computes ϕC , ϕ
M
MC ,
ϕAAC and ϕF : JF → JFC , whose kernel is given by:
KF =
〈
4∑
i=1
[ci]Fi,
8∑
i=5
[ci]Fi−4,
12∑
i=9
[ci]Fi−8
〉
.
– If b = 1: the signer outputs ker
(
ϕCAC
)
and the verifier computes ϕACAMC and
ϕMCAMC and checks that these isogenies map to JAMC .
4 Complexity and security
It is important to observe that the security analysis of the genus 1 problems
extends to our setting easily and so, those interested in further details are invited
to read [10].
Let us consider a prime of the form p = leAA l
eM
C l
eC
C f ± 1, a supersingular
hyperelliptic curve H over Fp2 and bases {A1, A2, A3, A4}, {M1,M2,M3,M4}
and {C1, C2, C3, C4} for JH [l
eA
A ], JH [l
eM
M ] and JH [l
eC
C ] respectively.
The following problems are assumed to be infeasible in a quantum setting:
Problem 1 (DSSI: Decisional supersingular isogeny problem). Let H ′ be another
supersingular hyperelliptic curve over Fp2 with genus 2. Decide whether JH′ is
(leAA , l
eA
A )-isogenous to JH .
Problem 2 (CSSI: Computational supersingular isogeny problem). Let HA be a
supersingular hyperelliptic curve over Fp2 with genus 2. Let ϕA : JH → JA be
an isogeny whose kernel is generated by
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KA =
〈
4∑
i=1
[ai]Ai,
8∑
i=5
[ai]Ai−4,
12∑
i=9
[ai]Ai−8
〉
(8)
for some ai ∈ F2n . Given JA and {ϕA(Mj)}j=1,...,4, find generators for KA.
Problem 3 (SSCDH: Supersingular computational Diffie-Hellman). Let us con-
sider ϕA : JH → JA an isogeny whose kernel is
KA =
〈
4∑
i=1
[ai]Ai,
8∑
i=5
[ai]Ai−4,
12∑
i=9
[ai]Ai−8
〉
, (9)
for some ai ∈ F2n and let ϕM : JH → JM whose kernel is
KM =
〈
4∑
i=1
[mi]Mi,
8∑
i=5
[mi]Mi−4,
12∑
i=9
[mi]Mi−8
〉
(10)
for some mi ∈ FleM
M
. Given {ϕA(Mj), ϕM (Aj)}j=1,...,4 and the jacobians
JA, JM , find the set G associated to
JH
(KA,KM)
.
Problem 4 (SSDDH: Supersingular decision Diffie-Hellman). Given a tuple sam-
pled with probability 1/2 from one of the following two distributions:
1. (JA, JB, {ϕA(Mi)}i, {ϕM (Ai)}i, JAM ), where JA, JM , {ϕA(Mi)}i, {ϕM (Ai)}i
are as in Problem 3 and JAM = JH/〈KA,KM 〉.
2. (JA, JB, {ϕA(Mi)}i, {ϕM (Ai)}i, JC), where JA, JM , {ϕA(Mi)}i, {ϕM (Ai)}i
are as in Problem 3 and JC = JH/〈KA′ ,KM ′〉, with
KA′ =
〈
4∑
i=1
[a′i]Ai,
8∑
i=5
[a′i]Ai−4,
12∑
i=9
[a′i]Ai−8
〉
KM ′ =
〈
4∑
i=1
[m′i]Mi,
8∑
i=5
[m′i]Mi−4,
12∑
i=9
[m′i]Mi−8
〉
where {a′i}i ∈ Z/l
eA
A and {m
′
i}i ∈ Z/l
eM
M are chosen following the criteria in
Section 3.2 [8].
determine from which distribution the tuple sampled.
Problem 5 (DSSP: Decisional supersingular product). Given an (leAA , l
eA
A )-isogeny
ϕA : J0 → J1 and a tuple sampled with probability 1/2 from one of the following
two distributions:
1. (J1, J2, ϕ
′) where the product J1 × J2 is chosen at random among those
(leBB , l
eB
B )-isogenous to J0×J1 and where ϕ
′ : J1 → J2 is a random (l
eA
A , l
eA
A )-
isogeny, and
2. (J1, J2, ϕ
′) where J1 is chosen at random among those surfaces with the same
cardinality as J0 and ϕ
′ : J1 → J2 is a random (l
eA
A , l
eA
A )-isogeny,
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determine which distribution the tuple is sampled.
Problem 6 (MSSCDH: Modified supersingular computational Diffie-Hellman).
Keeping the notations used in problem 4, given JA, JM and ker(ϕM ), determine
whether JC = JAM .
Problem 7 (MSSDDH: Modified supersingular decision Diffie-Hellman). Keep-
ing the notations used in problem 4, given JA, JM , JC and ker(ϕM ), determine
JAM .
Problem 8 (1MSSCDH: Modified supersingular computational Diffie-Hellman,
one-sided version). Given JA, JM and an oracle to solve problem 6 for any
JA, JM ′ , ker(ϕM ′ ), where JM ′ ≇ JM , solve problem 6 for JA, JM and ker(ϕM ).
Problem 9 (1MSSDDH: Modified supersingular decisional Diffie-Hellman, one-
sided version). Given JA, JM , JC and an oracle to solve problem 7 for any
JA, JM ′ , ker(ϕM ′ ) where JM ′ ≇ JM , solve problem 7 for JA, JM , JC and ker(ϕM ).
4.1 Remarks on security: completeness, soundness, zero-knowledge,
unforgeability and invisibility
Concerning the security of these algorithms, it is required to prove that both
CON and DIS are complete, sound and zero-knowledge. We recall [11] that a
verification system is complete if some prover is able to convince the verifier of
true statements, whereas soundness describes the ability of the verifier to detect
false statements.
When it comes to prove completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge for
CON and DIS, we may use the reasoning in [16] having in mind that random
integers are now replaced by scalars satisfying certain conditions that guarantee
maximality and isotropicity. Furthermore, there is a subtlety concerning com-
pleteness for the DIS protocol: if JF = JAM contains subgroups K1,K2 such
that JAM/K1 = JAM/K2, then JAM would be a branch point in the covering
space of the jacobian of the modular curve X0(l
eC
C ), which is hyperelliptic in
a few specific cases [21]. Therefore the chance of JAM being equal to such a
jacobian is negligible.
In order to prove unforgeability and invisibility, we can use, again after adapt-
ing the methods for our genus-2 context, the reasonings of [16].
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